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Two Arguments Against Lying 
Christine M. Korsgaard 
   
 
§1 
  In recent years philosophers have welcomed the development of a widespread 
interest  in  philosophical  ethics.    In  their  concern  about  the  bewildering  ethical 
questions  generated  by  medical  technology,  legal  practice,  and  the  power  and 
responsibility of the modern corporation, members of the professions and of the public 
have  turned  to  philosophy,  traditional  repository  of  rigorous  moral  thought.    This 
concern  has  provided  philosophers  with  an  opportunity  to  show  that  our  subject  is 
important and useful, and that we have knowledge on which others might draw.  And 
so the profession has responded with the development of courses, textbooks, and a vast 
literature on the questions of "applied ethics." 
  Yet  a  gap  between  traditional  ethical  philosophy  and  the  solution  of  ethical 
problems  remains.    Writers  on  applied  ethics  do  not  seem  to  draw  very  heavily  on 
traditional theories, and certainly do not draw on their details.  Often the "application" 
consists  simply  in  borrowing  a  principle  which  the  theory  defends.    And  often  that 
principle gives an answer which seems too facile and too extreme.  Theorists, in turn, 
know that you can have a real mastery of the concepts and arguments of a complex 
ethical theory and yet, when confronted by an ethical problem, find that you have no 
idea  what  resolution  the  theory  provides.    To  some  extent  this  gap  is  sociologically 
produced, for often different people are drawn to the different kinds of work.  But it may 
also be that we have not thought enough yet about what sort of an activity "applying" 
an ethical theory is.            
  This  paper  is  an  attempt  to  begin  to  think  about  that  question.    The  moral 
problem  I  will  consider  is  whether  and  to  what  extent  we  may  tell  benevolent  or 
paternalistic  lies.    I  take  this  to  be  an  important  problem  about  which  we  need 
theoretical help, because while most of us agree that there is a general presumption 
against paternalistic lies, we also agree that some of them are legitimate.  The question 
is which ones and why.  I will look at what happens when two of the most important 
moral  theories  in  our  tradition  -  those  of  Sidgwick  and  Kant  -  are  applied  to  this 
problem.    In  each  case,  I  will  approach  the  question  of  when  paternalistic  lies  are 
permissible by asking why they are in general wrong, so that we can identify the cases 
in which the consideration that disallows them does not hold.  Sidgwick and Kant were 
both  deeply  concerned  about  the  practical  side  of  ethics  and  wrote  more  than  most 
traditional moral philosophers about casuistical questions.  Yet their views exemplify 
the tendency of theory to go to extremes, for Sidgwick's theory mandates  benevolent 
deception on a massive scale, while Kant's apparently allows none.1  I will show how the 
difference in their conclusions can be traced to the different requirements they impose 
on ethical concepts.   One of the tasks of theoretical ethics is to provide an account of 
the status of ethical concepts - where they come from and why we are justified in using 
them.    I  will  argue  that  differences  in  the  status  of  ethical  concepts  can  make  a 
difference in how we decide which objects to apply them to.   If this is right, theoretical 
and applied ethics are inseparable, not only because the principles are borrowed from 
the  theories,  but  because  each  theory  must  teach  us  how  its  own  principles  and 
concepts apply to the objects and events we encounter in our lives. 
 
§2 
  A consequentialist is committed to the view that the rightness or wrongness of 
an action depends entirely on its consequences.  The right action is the one with the 
best  possible  consequences  realizable  under  the  circumstances.  The  consequences           
considered  may  be  either  the  direct  consequences  of  the  particular  action,  or  the 
consequences of a general rule the action instantiates, a disposition it expresses, or an 
institution or practice it serves.  In any case, the value of the consequences must be 
determinable before the rightness of the action can be ascertained.  Consequentialist 
reasoning about what is right must start from a knowledge of which consequences are 
good. 
  On a consequentialist view, lies will be wrong only if they do more harm than 
good.  Whether they do so is a question of empirical fact.  But most consequentialists 
have found it so obvious that lies tend to be harmful that they do not bother to argue 
the  point. Sidgwick says  simply that "…  it is generally a man's  interest to  know the 
truth … ." (ME 448)2   But it is clear how the argument should go, for knowledge of the 
truth  is  necessary  for  success  at  the  instrumental  reasoning  by  which  the 
consequentialist believes the good is pursued.  So we achieve the best results when we 
can rely upon one other to be sources of true information. 
  But  benevolent  lies are  aimed at achieving  good results,  so  if there is  even  a 
general presumption against them, it must  be  because they are normally misguided.  
This in turn would have to be because of some general empirical tendency.  I think that 
the  argument  many  consequentialists  would  use  to  explain  the  presumption  against 
benevolent lies is that an individual is normally in the best position to judge what is 
good or bad for herself.   If you lie to someone for her own good, it is because you think 
that you know better than she does what it will be good for her to know.  Perhaps you 
think that she should be spared painful information, or diverted from making a poor 
decision.   Usually, according to this argument, you will be wrong as a matter of fact, 
because she is in the best position to judge what is good in her own case.   
    A  tension  in  this  argument  emerges  when  one  reflects  on  two  of  the 
assumptions  on  which  it  depends.    One  of  the  assumptions  of  the  consequentialist 
approach  generally  is  that  we  can  have  determinate  knowledge  about  what           
consequences are good or bad.  This account of the presumption against benevolent lies 
assumes that persons are, as a matter of fact, the best judges of what is good or bad for 
themselves.  These assumptions do not harmonize well together.  We might ask, with 
Socrates, why the science of the good is the only science in which everyone is supposed 
to be equally expert.3      
  The most important school of philosophical consequentialists, the utilitarians, of 
course have an answer to this question.  They believe that what is good or bad for a 
person  depends on some  sort of  psychological  state to which the person has  special 
access:   what is good is either pleasure, or the satisfaction of desire, and what is bad is 
pain or frustration.  Sidgwick defines pleasure as "feeling which the sentient individual 
at the time of feeling it implicitly or explicitly apprehends to be desirable,"  making it by 
definition something to which the individual has special access. (ME 131)  If a person 
has  a special ability to identify what is good in her own case, then there is some reason 
to believe she is in the best position to make choices for herself.  Since she needs the 
truth in order to make her choices well, we can argue on utilitarian grounds that she 
has a right to the truth.4   
  But  this  kind  of  consideration  does  not  show  that  the  individual  is  best  at 
predicting  what  will  bring  about  good  results  in  her  own  case.    She  may  lack  the 
appropriate  technical  knowledge.    And  among  the  many  problems  involved  in  the 
assessment of pleasure and pain which Sidgwick describes, there are some that put the 
individual in an especially poor position to judge what she will find pleasant at a later 
stage.5    For  example,  in  certain  emotional  states  you  cannot  properly  imagine  the 
pleasures and pains attendant upon emotional states of an opposite kind. (ME 144-145) 
And persons are unable to properly anticipate how much they will enjoy certain things 
later in life. (ME 147)  So the general rule that persons can make the best choices for 
themselves will often fail, and will not support a strong presumption against benevolent           
lies.  Accordingly, the utilitarian will see many benevolent lies not merely as excusable, 
but as straightforwardly right. 
  Sidgwick explicitly acknowledges this.  He thinks that the morality of Common 
Sense  is  "unconsciously  utilitarian",  and  that  its  long-term  logical  and  historical 
tendency is towards a more thoroughgoing utilitarianism.  (ME 423-457) And one of the 
cases he adduces to show this is the case of the Common Sense attitude to benevolent 
lies: 
… where deception is designed to benefit the person deceived, Common 
Sense seems to concede that it may sometimes be right:  for example, 
most  persons  would  not  hesitate  to  speak  falsely  to  an  invalid,  if  this 
seemed the only way of concealing facts that might produce a dangerous 
shock:   nor do I perceive that any one  shrinks from telling fictions to 
children, on matters upon which it is thought well that they should not 
know  the  truth.    But  if  the  lawfulness  of  benevolent  deception  in  any 
case be admitted, I do not see how we can decide when and how far it is 
admissible, except by considerations of expediency; that is, by weighing 
the gain of any particular deception against the imperilment of mutual 
confidence involved in all violation of truth. (ME 316) 
Sidgwick here employs a slippery slope argument common in defenses of utilitarianism.  
We may lie to children and invalids because it is for their own good.  So why shouldn't 
we lie to other persons when it is for their own good?  That Sidgwick himself is prepared 
to  endorse  large-scale  benevolent  deception  becomes  clear  later  in  The  Methods  of 
Ethics,  when  he  discusses  the  question  whether  utilitarianism  should  be  publicly 
promulgated.  Sidgwick believes he has established that according to utilitarianism, an 
action  done  in  secret  may  sometimes  be  right  which,  if  found  out,  would  be  wrong, 
because of the  bad effects of  publicity.   But he thinks that ordinary  persons will be 
misguided by this truth, and that they are better off believing they may only do what           
may be done openly.  Because of this, utilitarianism, if true, should be kept "esoteric"  
for utilitarian reasons.  With an evident relish for his paradox he concludes: 
Thus the Utilitarian conclusion, carefully stated, would seem to be this; 
that the opinion that secrecy may render an action right which would not 
otherwise be so should itself be kept comparatively secret; and similarly 
it seems expedient that the doctrine that esoteric morality is expedient 
should  itself  be  kept  esoteric.    Or  if  this  concealment  be  difficult  to 
maintain, it may be desirable that Common Sense should repudiate the 
doctrine which it is expedient to confine to an enlightened few.  (ME 490) 
Of course, this is a recommendation for concealment rather than directly for deception, 
but  it  seems clear  enough that  deception will  be  involved; the "enlightened few" will 
almost certainly have to voice moral opinions they do not hold.  Sidgwick thus favors 
wholesale deception of the public concerning important moral truths by an intellectual 
elite.6  
  Suppose that Common Sense, confronted by this unattractive result, digs in its 
heels and insists that the difference between a child and an adult is morally significant.  
While  we  may  deceive  a  child  for  its  own  good,  we  may  not  do  that  to  an  adult.  
Sidgwick will reply that the distinction between a child and an adult is morally arbitrary 
because  it  is  a  difference  of  degree,  a  matter  of  placement  on  a  continuum.    There 
seems to be no non-arbitrary place on the continuum to draw the line.  If we do draw 
the line at some selected place, we will get irrational results:  I may lie to you for your 
own good the day before your eighteenth birthday, say, but not the day after.  Yet all 
that has happened is that you are two days older, and that doesn't seem to be a good 
reason for the difference.  This violates one of the fundamental axioms of ethics, which 
is  that  we  must  not  treat  different  cases  differently  without  a  good  reason.    (ME 
209,379)  Moral issues cannot be settled by appeal to arbitrary distinctions like this, 
but must be settled by the principle of utility, because that principle will give us a clear           
justification for lying in some cases and not in others.  Sidgwick's commitment to this 
kind of argument is explicit in a discussion of the principle that everyone should be 
equally free. He argues:     
… it seems obviously needful to limit the extent of its application.  For it 
involves the negative principle that no one should be coerced for his own 
good alone; but no one would gravely argue that this ought to be applied 
to the case of children, or of idiots, or insane persons.  But if so, can we 
know a priori that it ought to be applied to all sane adults?  since the 
above-mentioned exceptions are commonly justified on the ground that 
children, etc., will manifestly  be  better off if they are forced to do and 
abstain as others think best for them; and it is, at least, not intuitively 
certain  that  the  same  argument  does  not  apply  to  the  majority  of 
mankind in the present state of their intellectual progress.  Indeed, it is 
often conceded by the advocates of this principle that it does not hold 
even in respect of adults in a low state of civilisation.   But if so, what 
criterion can be given for its application, except that it must be applied 
wherever  human  beings  are  sufficiently  intelligent  to  provide  for 
themselves  better  than  others  would  provide  for  them?    and  thus  the 
principle would present itself not as absolute, but merely a subordinate 
application of the wider principle of aiming at the general happiness or 
well-being of mankind. (ME 275) 
  This  passage  exemplifies  a  kind  of  slippery  slope  argument  that  Sidgwick 
employs frequently in his debunking of Common Sense morality.  This kind of slope is 
especially  slippery  because  it  has  two  sources.    One  is  the  usual  utilitarian  source:  
Sidgwick claims that we coerce children is because they will be better off, and if this is a 
reason in one case, it will be a reason in another.  But the other source of slipperiness 
is that the moral principle is operating with what I will call a pragmatic, as opposed to a           
metaphysically precise, concept.  If a concept is metaphysically precise, its application 
is  determined  wholly  by  features  of  the  thing  we  apply  it  to.    If  it  is  pragmatic,  its 
application  is  indeterminate  -  there  are  borderline  cases  -  and  it  can  only  be  made 
determinate artificially.  A concept which divides a continuum is often pragmatic, and 
must for practical purposes be to some extent arbitrarily set.  This need not mean that 
we have no good reason for drawing the line at the point that we do (although it might), 
but it will mean our reasons are considerations other than features of the objects to 
which the concept is applied.  The distinctions between the child and the adult, the 
deeply  troubled  and  the  mentally  ill,  the  "idiotic"  and  the  slow,  are  in  this  way 
pragmatic.  These are divisions of continuums, and where exactly we should draw the 
line is unclear.  To some extent the way that these distinctions are made does depend 
on features external to the persons in question - such as the kinds of work and the 
kinds of care that are available in the societies and cultures in which the distinctions 
are employed.   
  We all recognize that the concepts with which our positive laws operate are in 
this way pragmatic.  For instance, we are content to define a legal adult as anyone over 
eighteen or twenty-one.  This is not because although some people are "really" adults by 
that age and some are not, we must have the same law for everyone.  Perhaps there is a 
temptation  to  think  that  there  must  be  a  certain  degree  of  something  -  rationality, 
intelligence, self-control - that qualifies you as a metaphysically real adult, and that the 
ideal legal system would identify that and assign legal majority only when it is present.  
But rationality, intelligence, and self-control are themselves matters of degree, and the 
degree of them required for adulthood will in turn have to be determined pragmatically. 
This sort of consideration teaches us to resist the temptation to look for metaphysical 
precision in the concepts employed in the positive laws, and to accept the artificiality 
and cultural mutability of the concepts they employ.             
  But many people are resistant to the idea that moral laws might operate with 
concepts of this kind as well.  There is a temptation to think that a moral principle can 
only operate with a metaphysically precise concept, one whose application is at least in 
principle  perfectly  clear.  This  gives  rise  to  a  slippery  slope  argument  that  is  a 
commonplace in moral debate.   For example, some people believe that we cannot settle 
the  question  of  the  morality  of  abortion  until  we  find  a  metaphysically  precise 
distinction between mere fetuses and persons.  As in the case of adult and child, there 
is no reason to believe that there is a precise distinction, or that one adopted would not 
be itself be in part determined by pragmatic considerations, for the difference is one of 
degree.    Now  there  are  people  who  will  use  the  fact  that  the    mere-fetus/person 
distinction is one of degree as an argument against abortion.  They create a slippery 
slope from killing fetuses to killing infants to killing still older persons, and say where 
will it all end.  The only real difference here is a difference in the degree of dependence, 
and any setting of a certain amount of independence as a criterion of personhood will 
be arbitrary.  This kind of argument is also sometimes used against vegetarianism.  The 
ultimate  indeterminateness  of  the  plant/animal  distinction  can  be  used  to  create  a 
slippery  slope.    These  arguments  are  similar  to  the  argument  that  we  may  be 
paternalistic towards adults because we are paternalistic towards children and the only 
real difference is one of degree.  The philosophical instinct behind these arguments is 
that moral principles can only operate with metaphysically precise concepts or natural 
kinds and not with pragmatic concepts.  
  These slippery slope arguments are notoriously weak.  The trouble is that which 
way  the  slope  runs  depends  on  which  end  of  it  your  intuitions  are  most  securely 
fastened to.  Imagine someone who argues that the benefit to a child is not a sufficient 
reason for coercing him, for at that rate we might sometimes coerce adults.  Or imagine 
someone arguing that there is no reason we should not euthanize a seriously disabled 
and disfigured infant, just as we would not hesitate to abort a seriously disabled and           
disfigured fetus.  (You just raise up the lower end of the slope and the ball slides back 
into  the  other  fellow's  lap).    These  arguments  are  not  as  commonly  made  as  their 
conservative counterparts, but they are no worse - and no better.  That is the trouble - 
the slippery slope produced by the pragmatic concept can prove nothing, but at best is 
a heuristic device that shows us where we must look for some principles that will help.  
   Now Sidgwick is deeply concerned with this sort of problem.  He believes that 
ethics should proceed from self-evident principles, and that one of the criteria of a self-
evident principle is that "the terms of the proposition must be clear and precise." (ME 
338)    Because  pragmatic  distinctions  either  are  not  clear  and  precise,  or  are  only 
arbitrarily so, they destroy the self-evidence of the  principles that employ them. (ME 
293n)  In a discussion of whether government is justified by consent of the governed as 
expressed in voting, Sidgwick remarks that if it is voting that legitimates government 
then even children must be allowed to vote. And, he complains: 
… if to avoid this absurdity we exclude children, an arbitrary line has to 
be drawn …  (ME 298) 
This destroys the self-evidence of the principle. Sidgwick believes that an arbitrary and 
pragmatic  character  infects  many  of  the  concepts  used  in  Common  Sense  moral 
principles,  and  he  directs  his  account  of  Common  Sense  morality  to  freeing  "the 
common terms of Ethics, as far as  possible, from objection on this score." (ME  339) 
Because he thinks that his efforts to do this are unsuccessful, he thinks that only the 
principle of utility can resolve moral problems.  This comes out clearly in Sidgwick's 
recurring reflections about the concept of "veracity" itself.  Discussing the "Intuitional" 
view that veracity is right regardless of consequences, Sidgwick says: 
… we find that in the common notion of different kinds of actions, a line 
is  actually  drawn  between  the  results  included  in  the  notion  and 
regarded  as  forming  part  of  the  act,  and  those  considered  as  its 
consequences.  For example, in speaking truth to a jury, I may possibly           
foresee  that  my  words,  operating  along  with  other  statements  and 
indications, will unavoidably lead them to a wrong conclusion as to the 
guilt or innocence of the accused, as certainly as I foresee that they will 
produce a right impression as to the particular matter of fact to which I 
am testifying:  still, we should commonly consider the latter foresight or 
intention to determine the nature of the act as an act of veracity, while 
the former merely relates to a consequence.  We must understand then 
that  the  disregard  of  consequences  which  the  Intuitional  view  is  here 
taken to imply, only relates to certain determinate classes of action (such 
as  Truth-speaking)  where  common  usage  of  terms  adequately  defines 
what events are to be included in the general notions of the acts, and 
what regarded as their consequences. (ME 97) 
But later Sidgwick denies that common usage adequately defines which consequences 
are to count as rendering a communication veracious: 
…  we  found  no  clear  agreement  as  to  the  fundamental  nature  of  the 
obligation;  or  as  to  its  exact  scope,  i.e.  whether  it  is  our  actual 
affirmation as understood by the recipient which we are bound to make 
correspondent  to  fact  (as  far  as  we  can),  or  whatever  inferences  we 
foresee that he is likely to draw from this, or both.  (ME 355) 
This sort of problem becomes especially acute when a gradual change in our linguistic 
practices renders it uncertain what inferences the recipient of our words will draw from 
them.   
In the case of formulæ imposed by law -- such (e.g.) as declarations of 
religious  belief  …  a  difficulty  is  created  by  the  gradual  degradation  or 
perversion of their meaning, which results from the strong inducements 
offered  for  their  general  acceptance;  for  thus  they  are  continually 
strained  and  stretched  until  a  new  general  understanding  seems           
gradually  to  grow  up  as  to  the  meaning  of  certain  phrases;  and  it  is 
continually disputed whether we may veraciously use the phrases in this 
new  signification.    A  similar  process  continually  alters  the  meaning  of 
conventional expressions current in polite society.  When a man declares 
that he 'has great pleasure in accepting' a vexatious invitation, or is 'the 
obedient servant' of someone whom he regards  as an inferior, he uses 
phrases which were probably once deceptive.  If they are so no longer, 
Common  Sense condemns as  over-scrupulous the  refusal to use them 
where it is customary to do so.  But Common Sense seems doubtful and 
perplexed where the process of degradation is incomplete and there are 
still persons who may be deceived… (ME 314-315)7 
Sidgwick  also  emphasizes  our  doubts  about  whether  the  use  of  such  devices  as 
suppressio veri  and suggestio falsi  is within the scope of veracity. (ME  316-317,448-
449) The implication of these remarks is that the very concept of veracity is a pragmatic 
one, which therefore cannot play a role in a self-evident principle.   
  For  Sidgwick,  a  large  part  of  the  appeal  of  the  principle  of  utility  is  that  it 
enables us to settle questions in a definite way.  It enables us to apply the concepts of 
right and wrong firmly to cases by linking them, at least in principle, to solid empirical 
facts, facts about pleasure and pain.  It bypasses the use of pragmatic distinctions like 
those between veracity and falsehood, adults and children.  The Methods of Ethics  is 
littered with questions like:  "We seem to condemn either extreme:  yet what clear and 
accepted principle can be stated for determining the true mean?"  (ME 249)  "Where 
then is the limit to be fixed?"  (ME 334)   "But if the rule does not hold for an extreme 
case, where can we draw the line?"  (ME 308) and the answer is always "We do not seem 
able to obtain any clear and generally accepted principle for deciding this point, unless 
the Utilitarian formula be admitted as such."  (ME 348)  Utility is the central concept of           
ethics because it is the only one with the precision requisite to render its principle self-
evident.8 
 
§3 
  The  Kantian  begins  from  an  altogether  different  theory  of  value.    Kant 
distinguishes those things which are unconditionally good - things which are good in 
themselves and so in any and all conditions - from things which are only conditionally 
good - that is, things whose goodness depends upon external conditions.  According to 
Kant, the only unconditionally good thing is a good will.  (G 393/9)  Everything else 
which is good has only a conditional value.  In the argument that culminates in the 
second formula of the Categorical Imperative, the Formula of Humanity, Kant tells us 
that "All objects of inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and 
the  needs  founded  on them  did not  exist, their object would be without worth."   (G 
428/46)  In other words, the things we desire have value, because we want and need 
them, not the reverse.  Our desire is a condition of their value.  Our wanting them is not 
enough to make them good, however, for obviously many of the things we want are not 
good.  Even if we want them we will not judge them good unless they are conducive to 
our happiness.  And:  
It need hardly be mentioned that the sight of a being adorned with no 
feature  of a  pure and  good  will, yet enjoying  uninterrupted  prosperity, 
can never give pleasure to a rational impartial observer.  Thus the good 
will seems to constitute the indispensable condition even of worthiness to 
be happy. (G 393/9) 
When an object is conditionally good, we must determine whether the condition of its 
goodness is met.  Say the initial condition is that someone desires that a certain state of 
affairs be realized.  Then we can raise the further question why it should be good that 
this person's desire should be satisfied.  If we say it makes him happy, we can ask why           
it is good that he should be happy.  In this way we give rise to a regressive argument, a 
search for the unconditioned condition of the goodness of the thing.  In Kant's view, this 
condition will always be the presence of a good will.  A good will confers value on the 
objects of choice of the person who has it, for 
… rational nature exists as an end in itself.  Man necessarily thinks of 
his  own  existence  in  this  way;  thus  far  it  is  a  subjective  principle  of 
human actions.  Also every other rational being thinks of his existence by 
means of the same rational ground which holds also for myself; thus it is 
at the same time an objective principle from which, as supreme practical 
ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will.  The practical 
imperative, therefore, is the following:  Act so that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and 
never as a means only.  (G 429/47) 
By  "humanity"  Kant  means  the  power  of  free  rational  choice,  for  "the  capacity  to 
propose an end to oneself is the characteristic of humanity"  (MMV 392/50) and in fact 
"rational nature is distinguished from others in that it proposes an end to itself."  (G 
437/56)  According to Kant the choice of an end is always an act of freedom.  (MMV 
386/42)  We  regard  the  objects  of  our  own  free  rational  choices  as  good  (this  is  a 
"subjective  principle  of  our  actions")  and  so  we  must  regard  the  objects  of  the  free 
rational choices of others as good as well.  This makes humanity, or the power of free 
rational choice, the limiting condition of the rationality of choice itself.  That is to say:  
for a choice to be rational, it must be consistent with the supreme and unconditional 
value of the power of free rational choice.9  
   One of the examples that follow the Formula of Humanity is the case of a lying 
promise.  A man is in need of money and "borrows" some, falsely promising to pay it 
back although he knows he will not be able to.  Kant explains what is wrong with the 
action this way:           
For he whom I want to use for my own purposes by means of such a 
promise cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting against him and 
cannot contain the end of this action in himself … he who transgresses 
the rights of men intends to make use of the persons of others merely as 
a means, without considering that, as rational beings, they must always 
be esteemed at the same time as ends, i.e., only as beings who must be 
able to contain in themselves the end of the very same action. (G 430-
431/48) 
When Kant says that the other "cannot assent to my mode of acting against him," he 
does not mean merely that  if the  other  knew I  was  lying he  would find my conduct 
objectionable.  This is probable, of course, but he might not.  The case might be trivial 
and he might not care how I act; it must still turn out to be true that he "cannot assent 
to my mode of acting" if this is a correct analysis of what is wrong.  Similarly, when 
Kant says that the other is "unable to contain the end of this action in himself," he does 
not merely mean that the other cannot happen to have the same purpose.  Obviously he 
can.  In the example, for instance, the deceived lender may be a generous person who 
was  longing  for  a  way  to  give  me  the  money  outright  without  wounding  my  pride.  
Surely this fact would not mitigate the wrongness of my deception.  What Kant means, I 
believe, is that other person cannot assent to my action because he is not in a position 
to.  This is because he is deceived.  By the nature of the case, he doesn't know how I am 
acting, and you cannot assent to a transaction you do not know is occurring.10  In the 
same way, he cannot "contain in himself" the end of the same action because he is not 
in a position to.  He doesn't know what the real end of the action is, and is therefore not 
in a position to make it his own - to choose, freely, to contribute to its realization.  In 
the example, the other person believes the end of the action is my temporary possession 
of his money, when in fact it is my indefinite possession of it.  What makes my action           
wrong is not that he would  not have chosen to cooperate in promoting that outcome, 
but simply that he did  not.11 
  If  our  way  of  acting  is  to  be  consistent  with  the  unconditional  value  of  free 
rational choice, others must be able to assent to the transactions in which we engage 
them, and  be in a  position to  voluntarily choose to further the ends at which those 
transactions are aimed.  There are two things that interfere with these requirements:  
coercion and deception.  The person who is forced to engage in a transaction or further 
an end, and the person who is fooled into it, cannot be said to assent to the transaction 
or choose the end.  These persons are therefore being treated as mere means to the 
ends  of  others.    As  free  rational  beings,  persons  must  be  allowed  to  choose  for 
themselves  what  transactions  they  will  engage  in  and  what  ends  they  will  promote.  
This is what it means to treat persons as ends in themselves. 
  This argument not only shows why lying is wrong, but that it is one of the two 
most fundamentally wrong things you can do to others.  Coercion and deception are the 
two  ways  of  using  others  as  mere  means.    Lies  are  therefore  wrong  in  themselves, 
regardless  of  whether  they  are  told  with  good  intentions  or  bad.    Kant  condemns 
benevolent  lies  for  exactly  the  same  reason  as  mischievous  or  malicious  ones.    But 
Kant's  theory  of  value  implies  something  even  stronger  than  this.    A  coercive  or 
deceptive character not only renders an action wrong, but robs the end of the action of 
its value.  For the goodness of the end depends upon the rationality of the choice of the 
end, but an end pursued by way of a bad action has not been rationally chosen.  The 
condition of its goodness - consistency with the value of free rational choice - is not met, 
and so it is not a good end.  In this way, Kant's value theory leads to a sort of unanimity 
criterion of value.12  "Good" is a concept of practical reason, and so "what we call good 
must be, in the judgment of every reasonable man, an object of the faculty of desire, 
and the evil must be, in everyone's eyes, an object of aversion."  (C2 60-61/62-63)  For 
an end to be good, it must be possible for everyone to agree to it.            
… reason  has no  dictatorial authority; its verdict is always  simply the 
agreement  of  free  citizens,  of  whom  each  one  must  be  permitted  to 
express,  without  let  or  hindrance,  his  objections  or  even  his  veto.  (C1 
A738-739/B766-767/593) 
 An end achieved through a lie violates this condition, for the deceived person has not 
had a chance to agree or to cast his veto.  Thus, a lie for a good  end is not only wrong.  
It appears to be, strictly speaking, impossible. 
  Now this result seems much too strong.  For most of us think that there are 
some cases in which benevolent lies are permissible.  The ends in these cases will be 
ones  which,  whatever  Kant's  theory  says,  we  would  certainly  regard  as  good  if  they 
could be achieved by honorable means.  For example, there is Sidgwick's case of the lie 
told to an invalid to spare him a dangerous shock.  Sidgwick points out that we allow 
the use of coercion on children, idiots, and the insane; as we have seen Kant ranks 
deception and coercion together.  Kant would have to agree that we may sometimes use 
coercion on such persons, for their own safety and that of others.  And if we may use 
coercion,  then  we  may  lie.    Presumably  there  will  be  cases  in  which  lying  is  the 
preferable strategy, since coercion may well involve violence.  If there are cases where 
benevolent deception is allowable, how can Kant's theory account for those cases? 
  One thing that we  cannot  do  is  handle  such  cases  by  saying simply that the 
person to whom we lie would  agree to the end for which the lie is told.  This would be 
to adopt the reading of Kant's "possibility of containing the end" criterion which I have 
rejected.   For one thing, this would justify manipulative  conduct towards those  who 
happen to share our ends (as in the case of the false promise made to one who would be 
glad to give you the money outright).   Furthermore, for me to make the judgment that 
you would agree to this end is already for me to take the decision out of your hands in 
the way that the theory forbids.  Although Kant agrees that we have a duty to promote 
the happiness of others, "What they count as belonging to their happiness is left up to           
them to decide."  (MMV 388/46)  So benevolence cannot override the essential duty to 
let others determine their own ends.  If I lie with the excuse that you would agree to my 
end, I am attempting to justify preempting your free use of your reason by appealing to 
an idea that I have arrived at because I have already preempted it.  This clearly will not 
do. 
  We  could  get  a  more  promising  argument  for  permissible  lies  if  we  could 
establish  in  the  pertinent  cases  that  the  deceived  one  would,  to  use  Kant's  phrase, 
"assent to my mode of acting against him."  This has some of the same difficulties about 
preemptive judgment as the rejected suggestion, but at least it will only excuse lies to 
those who would specifically agree to be lied to, not to everyone who shares the purpose 
for which the lie was told.  But in order to keep these two excuses distinct, we must not 
allow the inference that someone would agree to be lied to, simply because they would 
agree to the purpose for which the lie was told.  Otherwise we will be back where we 
started.  In any case, that inference seems incorrect.  The requirement that each person 
be allowed the free use of her  own reason in determining her actions and  ends is a 
procedural one.  It is important not only that the choice be the one that a person would 
have made, but that she actually gets to make it.   
  So our argument that the person would agree to be lied to must not appeal to, or 
appeal only to, the end for which the lie is told.  We must justify the lie more directly.  It 
seems clear that in order to annul the procedural requirement that each person decide 
for herself we must show that the procedure could not in any case be carried out.  We 
must argue that the agent is not in a position to make a free rational decision - that she 
is not (at present, perhaps) autonomous, and that were she rational she would agree 
that someone in her (actual) condition may be lied to or coerced.  Of course, we do not 
want to justify telling any  lies whatever to non-autonomous persons.  The hypothetical 
acceptance of both  the mode of action and  the end must be defended.  And this is the 
usual  way  of  justifying  our  manipulative  transactions  with  children,  the  mentally           
handicapped, and the insane.  We argue both that they are not autonomous because of 
their  conditions,  and  that  they  would  if  rational  agree  that  such    persons  may  be 
manipulated forthese  ends to be realized. 
  The  ends  must  be  ones  that  we  can  fairly  presume  that  non-autonomous 
persons would hold if they were rational.  How can we tell what ends they would choose 
without being guilty of preemptive judgement?  One end that we can attribute to them 
without  preemptive  judgement  is  their  humanity  itself,  their  power  of  free  rational 
choice.  Since this is unconditionally valuable, this is an end they would hold if they 
were rational.  Presumably we may lie to someone who lacks autonomy if our end is to 
restore or preserve her autonomy, or to restore or preserve things which are necessary 
conditions of it, such as physical well-being.  Since all human beings want to be happy, 
we can also safely attribute this end to them (G 415/33), but we will be on less firm 
ground  here  because  we  cannot  without  preemptive  judgement  determine  what  they 
would count as part of their happiness.  And this must be treated as secondary to the 
restoration of autonomy, if that is possible.    
  Because we cannot justify the lie by appeal to its purpose alone, but must also 
appeal to the lack of autonomy of the person lied to, we will not be able to determine 
which paternalistic lies are permissible unless we have some criteria for determining 
who is autonomous.  But here we run into a difficulty.  Autonomy in the ordinary sense 
appears to be a matter of degree.  Children are thought to acquire it little by little, for 
instance.  So again we get Sidgwick's question about where to draw the line - how we 
are  to  decide  what  counts  as  autonomous  enough  to  ground  a  claim  against 
paternalism.  Sidgwick thinks that we should refrain from using coercion on those who 
are "sufficiently intelligent to provide for themselves."  Presumably Sidgwick thinks that 
"intelligence" is a matter of degree, and a certain degree of it is sufficient for expedient 
self-government.  Whether you have this degree of intelligence will show up in various 
ways, among them the choices you actually make when left to your own devices.  The           
one deciding whether to resort to paternalism judges whether the other is making her 
choices  well.      Now  the  Kantian  cannot  solve  the  problem  about  ascertaining  and 
measuring autonomy this way, for several reasons.  First, because Kant does not have 
an empirical theory of value, we are not in a position to judge the quality of the choices 
of others.  Of course we can see in the ordinary way if someone is poor at the choice of 
means,  and  we  can  ascertain  whether  his  choices  are  immoral.    But  because  each 
person determines for himself what he will count as part of his happiness, a person's 
choice  of  the  ends  he  will  pursue  is  not  otherwise  open  to  assessment.    We  cannot 
decide someone is insufficiently autonomous merely because he makes some choices we 
would  not  have  made  in  his  place.    But  further:    we  cannot  decide  someone  is  not 
autonomous because he is regularly making decisions we know are bad in the sense of 
immoral.  It is the capacity for autonomy, not its actual exercise, which gives a person 
the right to self-government.  Kant's theory may allow us to use manipulative tactics on 
children and the insane, on grounds of insufficient autonomy.  It does not allow us to 
use them on persons who are immoral.  We must have a way to distinguish persons 
who should be regarded as capable of autonomous conduct, however they may actually 
behave, who therefore are held responsible when they go wrong, and to whom we have 
no excuse for lying, from persons who should be regarded as incompletely developed or 
ill, who therefore are not held responsible when they go wrong, and to whom we may lie 
under the conditions described above.13 
  What makes this especially difficult is that the capacity for free rational choice, 
as Kant understands it, is not really a natural attribute at all.  Freedom of the will is an 
idea  of  pure  practical  reason,  and,  according  to  Kant,  a  property  that  we  ascribe  to 
ourselves when we act.  We ascribe it to ourselves because the moral law commands 
categorically, and we recognize that we can do what we ought. (C2 30/30; 42/43)  We 
do not ascribe it to ourselves because we have theoretical evidence of its presence - that 
would be impossible, for in Kant's philosophy freedom is beyond the limits of theoretical           
knowledge.  Similarly, we ascribe it to other persons not because we have theoretical 
evidence that they have it but because it is a duty to do so.  Respect for humanity in the 
persons of others demands that we attribute to them the capacity for free choice and 
action, regardless of how they are acting: 
Thus it is also with the reproach of vice, which must never burst out in 
complete contempt or deny the wrongdoer all moral worth, because on 
that hypothesis  he could never  be  improved  either  - and this latter is 
incompatible with the idea of man, who as such (as a moral being) can 
never lose all predisposition to good.  (MMV 463-464/129) 
Actual conduct, then, does not provide evidence for or against freedom. Furthermore, 
since every human being is imperfectly rational, we all fall short of acting completely 
autonomously.      But  then  how  are  we  to  distinguish  the  psychotic,  whose  conduct 
should not be attributed to freedom, from the evil person, whose conduct should?  We 
cannot appeal directly to the kind of explanation their conduct admits of.  Kant's view is 
that all  conduct, viewed theoretically, admits of a deterministic causal explanation.  An 
evil  person's conduct is attributed to but not explained  by free choice.  The idea of 
freedom has no explanatory role at all.  Freedom is something we attribute to ourselves 
and others for moral purposes only.  (C2 51-58/52-59; 134-137/139-142) 
  In Kant's view, moral concepts generally are concepts of pure practical reason.  
They do not describe or explain anything about the world.  They get their hook into the 
world via the practical reason of each one of us, as individuals who make choices and 
decisions, who are therefore  bound by the moral law, and who in light of that must 
attribute freedom to ourselves and others.  Practical concepts are ideal concepts, and 
the things in the world to which we apply them, under the direction of the moral law, 
fall short of them.  No one exhibits perfect rationality, and so no one exhibits the perfect 
freedom which the moral law teaches us that we have.  But this means that facts about 
the world will not decisively settle the question which natural objects these concepts are           
to be applied to and which not.  What we find in the world is a continuum of more or 
less imperfectly rational beings.  As a rule we are obliged to treat them as capable of 
perfect rationality.  If we decide that somewhere along that continuum we will draw a 
line, beyond which we are excused from that obligation, the decision will be to some 
extent  arbitrary.    Or  in  any  case,  it  will  not  be  made  by  seeing  how  close  various 
persons come to actual freedom.  We cannot say:  "children are not yet in fact  fully 
free."  Theoretical statements about freedom have no standing.  The most we could say 
is that children should not be treated as fully free.  But the grounds for this practical 
statement are unclear.  The pressure of the moral law is towards treating every human 
being as a free rational being, regardless of actual facts. 
   
§4 
  Both Sidgwick and Kant uncover problems about applying moral concepts to the 
world.  Sidgwick thinks they are usually imprecise, and that ultimately we should be 
guided  instead  by  the  precise  concept,  utility.    Kant  thinks  that  they  are  precise  in 
themselves but don't exactly fit the things we find in the world, because they are ideals.  
He thinks we should apply them anyway, without regard for the world's imperfections.  
In  this  section  I  discuss  another  example  of  a  moral  concept  about  which  it  is 
particularly clear that the lines between Sidgwick and Kant are drawn in the way I have 
suggested.   
  The  concept  in  question  is  that  of  "legitimate  government."    Both  Kant  and 
Sidgwick  consider  the  question  when  a  government  established  by  revolutionary 
overthrow of a previous government becomes legitimate.  Sidgwick says: 
All are agreed that usurpation ought to be resisted; but as to the right 
behaviour towards an established government which has sprung from a 
successful usurpation, there is a great difference of opinion.  Some think 
that  it  should  be  regarded  as  legitimate  as  soon  as  it  is  firmly           
established:  others that it ought to be obeyed at once, but under protest, 
with the purpose of renewing the  conflict on a favourable opportunity:  
others  think  that  this  latter  is  the  right  attitude  at  first,  but  that  a 
usurping  government,  when  firmly  established,  loses  its  illegitimacy 
gradually, and that it becomes, after a while, as criminal to rebel against 
it as it was originally to establish it.  And this last seems, on the whole, 
the view of Common Sense; but the point at which the metamorphosis is 
thought  to  take  place  can  hardly  be  determined  otherwise  than  by 
considerations of expediency. (ME 300)14 
Kant, on the other hand, places himself firmly in the first camp Sidgwick mentions.  As 
is well known, Kant believes that any revolution is wrong, since the existing government 
must be taken to represent the general will of the people.  For a revolt to be legitimate, 
it would have to be in accordance  with the general will of the people, since coercion that 
does  not  meet  this  condition  is  mere  illegitimate  violence.    But  since  the  existing 
government represents the general will of the people, the revolutionary party of course 
does  not.  (MMJ  318-321/84-87)    However,  Kant  also  holds  that  if  a  revolution 
succeeds, the new government is immediately legitimate and owed the same allegiance 
as the old was. (MMJ 323/89)  Taxed by a reviewer15 with the oddity of this position, 
Kant replies: 
   Every matter of fact is an object that is an appearance (of sense); on 
the other hand, that which can be represented only through pure reason 
and which must be included among the Ideas -- that is the thing in itself.   
No object in experience can be given that adequately corresponds to an 
Idea.    A  perfect  juridical  [just]  constitution  among  men  would  be  an 
example of such an Idea. 
   When  a  people  are  united  through  laws  under  a  suzerain,  then  the 
people  are  given  as  an  object  of  experience  conforming  to  the  Idea  in           
general  of  the  unity  of  the  people  under  a  supreme  powerful  Will.  
Admittedly, this is only an appearance; that is, a juridical constitution in 
the most  general  sense  of the term  is  present.  Although the [actual] 
constitution may contain grave defects and gross errors and may need to 
be  gradually  improved  in  important  respects,  still,  as  such,  it  is 
absolutely unpermitted and culpable to oppose it.  If the people were to 
hold  that  they  were  justified  in  using  violence  against  a  constitution, 
however defective it might be, and against the supreme authority, they 
would be supposing that they had a right to put violence as the supreme 
prescriptive act of legislation in the place of every right and Law.  (MMJ 
371-372/139-140) 
The  legitimate state,  like the autonomous moral person, is an  idea  of  pure practical 
reason.  Kant is clear that the form of government that corresponds to this idea is a 
republic:    a  constitutional  government  in  which  legislation  is  carried  on  by 
representatives  of  the  citizens  (MMJ  340-341/112-113;  PP  349-353/93-97)  and  in 
which every adult is or can become a free, equal, and independent citizen (MMJ 313-
315/78-80).  But it is also clear that that no actual government is adequate to this idea.  
Still, we don't feel like saying that no government has ever really been legitimate.  Once 
again we get the problem of saying what comes close enough.   Perhaps it seems as if  
in this case we can easily say what comes close enough:  the existence of a constitution 
and a legislative body of elected representatives.  But even this would mean that there 
had  been no  legitimate governments until  very  recent  history.   And if we  suppose a 
legitimate government must meet another criterion which seems minimal and obvious - 
universal adult  suffrage  - then there  have  been no legitimate governments until this 
past century (our own, not Kant's).  Thus, rather than deciding how close a government 
has to be to the ideal before we will call it legitimate, Kant thinks we should simply treat           
any existing government as legitimate.  Like Sidgwick, although for a different reason, 
he does not see where to draw the line. 
 
§5 
  The  two  theories  that  I  have  been  examining  take  extreme  positions  on 
paternalistic  lies.    Sidgwick  allows  too  many,  Kant  apparently  allows  none.    I  have 
traced the extremism of both views to a common source:  a problem about applying 
ethical concepts to the world.  Both reject a popular model of applied ethics, according 
to which we work like this:  we find out which objects in the world fit the ontological 
categories with which our principles operate (for instance, which things are in fact mere 
fetuses and which are persons), and then marshall in the principles to see what they 
say about those kinds of objects.  On this popular model the real work - the hard work - 
of applied ethics is not ethical thought at all, but ontology or metaphysics.  Once the 
ontological issues are settled, the ethical principles are easy to apply.  Sidgwick and 
Kant both reject this model, because of a mismatch each perceives between the world 
and  the  concepts  we  employ  in  ethical  thought.    The  ontological  issues  cannot  be 
settled in the way proposed. 
  For  Sidgwick,  the  problem  arises  because  the  concepts  of  Common  Sense 
morality are imprecise.  A clear and precise concept would be one that picks out its 
objects  in  a  way  that  is  non-arbitrary  and  decisive.16      Only  a  precise  concept  can 
function in a real self-evident moral principle.  Since the concepts of "adult," "sane" and 
"veracious" are all imprecise, "never lie to a sane adult" could not possibly be a self-
evident moral principle.  The concept of utility is precise.  Pleasure and pain seem to 
have clear moral weight, yet they are also matters of theoretical fact.  So utility allows 
us to map practical concepts onto theoretical ones perfectly.  It makes the concepts of 
"right" and "wrong" fit the contours that the world provides - or more precisely, that the 
set of concepts we use in theoretically explaining the world provides.           
  For  Kant  the  problem  arises  not  because  moral  concepts  are  imprecise,  but 
because they are ideals of pure practical reason.  Nothing we find in the world is fully 
adequate to them,  yet we must apply them to things that we find there anyway,  for 
moral reasons.  Thus, each person ought to be treated like a free rational being, despite 
our  imperfect  rationality;    just  as  each  government  ought  to  be  treated  as  the 
embodiment of the general will of the people, though most real governments are corrupt 
despotisms born of illegitimate violence.  One must not lie to a free rational being, or 
revolt against the general will of the people.  If lying for a good end, or revolting for a 
better government, were justified  simply because actual persons and states fall short of 
the ideal, a slippery slope argument would quickly lead to extreme conclusions, since all 
persons fall short of perfect autonomy and all governments fail to embody the general 
will of the people.   
  So perhaps we should say that what we are looking for is not good reasons  for 
paternalism  or  revolution,  since  there  are  not  good  reasons  for  what  the  moral  law 
disallows, but excuses  for these kinds of action.  We think we may be excused from 
treating certain persons as autonomous and certain governments as legitimate.  But in 
order  to  decide  that  there  are  some  human  beings  to  which  we  will  not  apply  the 
concept of full autonomy, or some governments too despotic to count as legitimate, we 
apparently  will  have  to  draw  some  lines  that  are  not  firmly  grounded  either  in 
theoretical facts about those persons and governments or in the moral law.  We must 
decide  who to count as a free rational being, and what makes a state legitimate.  These 
decisions cannot be based on finding out which objects in fact are free rational beings 
or really embody the general will, because there are no such facts.  If applied ethics is 
done this way, its work is not metaphysical, but ethical and practical all the way down.  
Kant's own solution is to treat every government as legitimate and (almost) every human 
being as free and rational.  This is already a pragmatic decision, and it may seem to us 
to be  - not the incorrect one, because this is not a matter of correct or incorrect - but a           
poor one.  But now we must ask what the criteria for making these decisions should be.  
If we don't pick those who must be treated as free rational beings by determining who is 
in fact a free rational being, how do we do it?  We need some alternative method, or our 
decisions will be arbitrary.   
  The  answer  is  that  of  course  such  decisions  don't  have  to  be  completely  
arbitrary.  In deciding what objects to apply our ethical concepts to, we use available 
theoretical concepts that approximate them.17  Although we cannot find a perfect match 
between  ethical  concepts  and  natural  facts,  theoretical  considerations  do  provide 
guidance.    After  all,  it  is  theoretical  facts  which  teach  us  which  things  are  even 
potentially rational beings.  The ethical concept of a moral person is mapped on to the 
naturalistic concept of a human being.  And theoretical facts do teach us that there is a 
sense in which children and the insane are not as "autonomous" - that is, not as much 
in control of themselves - as ordinary adult persons are.  The sense of "in control of 
oneself" here will not  be  very  determinate.  It will  be a matter of  degree, and hardly 
adequate to Kant's notion of transcendental freedom.  But we must use it for casuistical 
purposes, because it is all we have.18     
  Although  Sidgwick  wants  to  use  the  principle  of  utility  directly  for  decision-
making  rather  than  for  concept-formation,  one  can  imagine  a  Sidgwickean  proposal 
that  we  make  the  notion  of  an  autonomous  rational  agent  precise  by  tying  it  to 
considerations  of  utility.19      If  what  is  at  issue  is  not  that  the  concept  be  applied 
correctly, but that it be applied well, the utilitarian will read "well" as "expediently."  So 
the Sidgwickean might urge us to count persons as autonomous when it is expedient - 
in utilitarian terms - to do so.  This would give us a clear way of deciding - in terms of 
theoretical facts - who was to be counted as autonomous and who was not.  Applied 
ethics would then recover the intellectual cleanliness of the popular model - the real 
work  would  be  theoretical.    But  the  trouble  with  the  proposed  way  of  achieving 
precision is that it would make the notion of autonomy subordinate  to that of utility.            
Freedom would not function as an independent value at all.  To only be truthful when it 
is  useful  is  to  care  only  for  utility,  not  for  freedom.    If  we  adopt  the  Sidgwickean 
strategy, we can seek empirical goals, but we cannot live up to rational ideals.  Besides, 
if we are going to use values in deciding how to apply our ethical concepts, why should 
we only use utility?  To say that our concepts can be applied well or badly needn't mean 
well  or  badly  in  the  utilitarian  sense.    Why  shouldn't  we  apply  them  in  a  way  that 
maximizes fairness or personal freedom? 
  A natural objection is that if we work this way there is a danger that we will 
simply adjust our ethical categories and principles reciprocally until we get whatever 
any result we want.   We  could just  decide, for  example, that all of the  categories of 
persons to whom we are tempted to tell benevolent lies should count as incompletely 
autonomous. Or that benevolent lies in certain cases aren't really lies at all.  Of course 
there are dangers of this kind, but it is not clear that we have any option but to face 
them, and to try to be intellectually honest.  If the concepts we use in ethics cannot be 
tied down to the world by firm theoretical criteria, the precision of the popular model of 
applied ethics is just not available.  
  It is true that the principle of utility gives us a way of recovering that precision.  
But as we have seen, the price of defining autonomy in terms of utility is to give it no 
real weight at all.  So now we must ask whether Sidgwick's demand for precision in 
ethical concepts is worth the cost of giving up rational ideals.  It is clear enough why in 
scientific  discourse  we  should  want  concepts  that  fit  as  neatly  as  possible  onto  the 
world.  It is not at all clear why that should be appropriate for normative discourse.  If 
there are ideals of practical reason, which outstrip the things we find in the world, we 
cannot give them up merely because they make applying ethical principles a difficult 
and uncertain enterprise.  If we value the Kantian ideal of free and non-manipulative 
relations among rational beings, for instance, and we want to approximate that ideal in 
the empirical human community, we must learn to be truthful and straightforward with           
one another, regardless of our imperfect autonomy, and the bad results to which it may 
sometimes lead.  In  ethics,  we  cannot always trim our  concepts  so that they  will  fit 
neatly onto the world.  Sometimes what we must do instead is try to reshape the world 
so that it will be more adequate to our concepts.  
    
  
    
 
         
                                                 
Notes
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  For  a  discussion  of  the  way  various  moral  theories  handle  this  issue,  and  of  the 
tendency of utilitarian and Kantian approaches to go to extremes, see Igor Primoratz, 
"Lying  and  the  'Methods  of  Ethics',"  International  Studies  in  Philosophy    Volume  XVI 
(1984) 35-57.  
2 The works of Henry Sidgwick and Immanuel Kant are cited parenthetically in the text. 
The following abbreviations are used: 
ME     Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics  
C1      Kant, Critique of Pure Reason  
G           Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.  
C2         Kant, Critique of Practical Reason.  
MMV       Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue.  
MMJ     Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice.  
PP     Kant, Perpetual Peace.  
For bibliographic information and an explanation of pagination see the references at the 
end of the paper.           
                                                                                                                                             
3  See, for example, Apology  19e-20c and 24d-25c;  Laches  186c; Protagoras  319bff; 
and Meno  89eff. 
4  In  the  sense  of  "right"  developed  in  Chapter  V  of  Mill's  Utilitarianism  :    we  have 
whatever rights it is useful that we should have. 
5 Sidgwick rejects Mill's view that some pleasures are better qualitatively than others 
which are similar or greater in quantity. (ME 94-95,127-128) If one does accept Mill's 
view, the problems about paternalism might seem to be worse, for the better pleasures 
can only be identified by those who have training in and experience of them.  It will be 
better for the rest of us to have this training foisted upon us, but we will only be able to 
see this after the training.  In Chapter III of On Liberty , however, Mill argues that these 
pleasures are best cultivated in the course of choosing a life for oneself. 
6  Interestingly, one of the reasons for concealing the utilitarian news from the general 
public  is  that    "…  the  concealment  [of  those  actions  which  are  only  right  when 
concealed] would in most cases have importantly injurious effects on the agent's habits 
of  veracity."    (ME  490)    The  enlightened  few  will  also  have  to  take  into  account  the 
danger to their habits of veracity, as Sidgwick has made clear earlier. (ME 482) 
7  Kant also worries about  polite salutations.  He asks, "Can an untruth from mere 
politeness (e.g. "your obedient servant" at the end of a letter) be taken as lying?  Nobody 
is  deceived  by  it."  (MPV  431/92-93)    Probably  both  Kant  and  Sidgwick  would  have 
appreciated the irony of the fact that the formula that occupies this place in modern 
official letters is "sincerely". 
8  Actually, Sidgwick is not even sure of this.  The concept of utility is only precise if 
pleasures and pains are in fact commensurable among themselves and with each other, 
and this could only be proved if we could have two different sensations at the same 
time,  which  is  impossible.    So  "the  belief  that  every  pleasure  or  pain  has  a  definite 
intensive quantity or degree must remain an a priori assumption, incapable of positive           
                                                                                                                                             
empirical verification."  The only reason he gives for its acceptance is that "the belief in 
its general validity is irresistible suggested in reflection on experience, and remains at 
any rate uncontradicted by experience."  (ME 146) 
9 This reading of the argument for the Formula of Humanity is explained and defended 
in more detail in my "Kant's Formula of Humanity" in Kant-Studien,  Band 77, Heft 2 
(April, 1986) 183-202. 
10 Even if you happen to know that the person is lying to you, there is a sense in which 
you cannot assent to the transaction.  If you say to the her:  "I know you don't mean to 
pay me back, but here's the money," the nature of the transaction is changed.  You are 
not assenting to a false promise, but giving a handout. 
11 This argument is explained more fully in my "The Right to Lie:  Kant on Dealing with 
Evil" in Philosophy and Public Affairs Volume 15, Number 4  (Fall, 1986). 
12 It follows from this theory of value that some states of affairs cannot be assessed as 
good or bad directly.   The cases I have in mind are those involving competition.  If two 
persons both want the same particular, irreplaceable object (a job, say, or a house) , 
practical reason does not say which outcome is good.  It can only say that whatever 
outcome results from procedures which (according to the categorical imperative) are fair 
is good. 
13  I should say that it is not clear to me whether Kant always saw that his theory has 
the  troublesome  consequences  about  making  these  distinctions  that  I  am  about  to 
describe.  In the Anthropology, for instance, he says confidently:  "Simple, misguided, 
stupid, foppish, foolish or offensively silly people differ from the mentally deranged not 
merely in the degree but also in the kind of their mental disorder…" (A 202/74)  One 
wonders what makes him so sure.  When discussing the question when someone may 
be exempt from punishment on grounds of insanity, he claims that philosophers and 
not the medical faculty must settle the question because it is "purely psychological."            
                                                                                                                                             
But then he says that this is only because of lack of scientific knowledge; there could be 
a physical cause of the action, but "physicians and physiologists in general have not yet 
reached  a  deep  enough  understanding  of  the  mechanical  element  in  man."  (A  213-
214/83-84)  So I cannot claim that the aspect of Kantianism which I am expounding 
was explicitly acknowledged by Kant, at least as far as judgments about the autonomy 
of  actual  persons  is  concerned.    In  the  next  section,  however,  I  will  show  that  he 
acknowledged it explicitly about another moral concept, that of legitimate government. 
14 In general, Sidgwick cannot see how the consideration of how much time has passed 
can possibly make a difference by itself.  Time is a continuum, and so as in the other 
cases  we  have  been  looking  at,  dividing  points  seem  to  be  arbitrary  if  we  cannot 
determine them  by  expediency.  Another  case  where this worries  Sidgwick is that of 
sexual purity. He says: 
…  where  divorce  by  mutual  consent,  with  subsequent  marriage,  is 
legalised, we do not call this an offence against Purity:  and yet if the 
principle  of  free  change  be  once  admitted,  it  seems  paradoxical  to 
distinguish purity from impurity merely by less rapidity of transition … 
(ME 358)   
If I have a new lover every ten years surely I am not promiscuous.  If I have a new lover 
every ten days perhaps I am.  But where, in between, shall we draw the line?  Every five 
years?  Every two years?  Every month?  In his footnote Sidgwick says:   
It  should  be  observed  that  I  am  not  asking  for  an  exact  quantitative 
decision, but whether we can really think that the decision depends upon 
considerations of this kind. (ME 358n) 
It is clear that he thinks that the temporal considerations must work in connection with 
"expediency" (utility) before they can make a difference.           
                                                                                                                                             
13 Professor Friedrich Bouterwek of Göttingen, in the Göttingen Journal  (Number 28, 
February 18, 1797).  Kant appended his replies to Bouterwek to the second edition of 
The Metaphysical Elements of Justice.  
16  In a slightly different way, Derek Parfit is concerned about the same problem.  He is 
not concerned about precision as a criterion for self-evidence.  But after showing us 
(stunningly) that our concept of a person is not as metaphysically precise as we might 
have thought, he concludes that  personal identity is "not what matters."  See Derek 
Parfit, Reasons and Persons.   Oxford:  the Clarendon Press, 1984. 
17  But we do not have to be slavishly attached to the use of theoretical concepts.   For 
example:    In  Kant's  theory  one  of  the  ideas  of  practical  reason  is  property.    To  say 
something is my property is to say that I am injured, or wronged, if someone uses it 
without my permission. (MMJ 245/51) It is clear why I am injured if someone wrests 
something from my hand,  so we  have an empirical  notion of possession as  physical 
detention.  But  this  does  not  exhaust  our  idea  of  property,  since  if  something  is  my 
property I am injured if another uses or removes it even if I am not present.  This shows 
that the notion of property is rational and not empirical. (MMJ 250/57)  Kant traces the 
notion to practical reason by an argument that shows that if we could not own things 
we could not successfully use them, and if we could not use them our freedom of action 
would be restricted for no reason. (MMJ 246/52-53)  But the important thing for my 
purposes here is the flexibility of the way this  concept is imposed on the world.   In 
many  cases,  the  objects  we  own  are  ordinary  physical  objects,  and  there  are  good 
reasons  of  simple  convenience  for  this.    But  we  don't  always  own  ordinary  physical 
objects.  Your right to a library book you have checked out would be a piece of property 
in Kant's theory (all "acquired rights" are property); but in that case what you own is 
not the physical object (you may not use it for kindling or tear out the pages for scratch 
paper), but only the privilege of reading from it for a certain length of time.  Or think of           
                                                                                                                                             
the way you own the furniture in your office, or shares in a corporation's stock.  The 
point is that we may divide the world into owned objects quite differently than we divide 
it  into  physical  objects.    And  as  the  case  of  library  books  shows,  our  reasons  for 
dividing it differently may be moral and evaluative.  The library loan system makes the 
"intelligible" book available to more people, and so may be defended either in terms of 
utility or fairness. 
18  I do not mean to imply that we should just use the intuitive notion of say, "being in 
control of oneself".   We should map our practical concepts onto theoretical ones that 
are as philosophically  well-defined and  respectable as we can make them.  Here the 
philosopher will have much to learn from the scientist.  Those working on applied ethics 
must learn as much as possible about the conditions of the persons about whom these 
decisions must be made from, say, psychiatrists, child psychologists, and doctors.  The 
notion of self-control must be analyzed carefully.  But it will still never turn out to be 
adequate to the ideal of transcendental freedom, and so decisions about cutoff points 
will still just have to be made. 
19  Although Sidgwick does not make this proposal about deliberate concept-formation, 
there is some suggestion in the Methods  that he thinks that historically, considerations 
of utility have influenced the formation of our ethical concepts.  (ME 423-459)  If this 
were  true  it  would  give  one  sense  in  which  Common  Sense  morality  would  be 
"unconsciously utilitarian."           
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